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discrimination because of their ethnic background. This applies to both segregated areas 
where most neighbors are immigrants from the same country of origin as the surveyed 
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of origin. The results suggest that housing discrimination rather than self-selection plays 
an important role in immigrant residential segregation. 
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1. Introduction 
Immigrant residential segregation has been a long-standing concern in many developed 
countries. This also holds true for Germany where concerns about the lack of immigrant 
integration and fears of “parallel societies” play an important role. In the policy debate, it 
is widely assumed that immigrants prefer to live in segregated residential areas (Münch 
2009). This view accords with theories suggesting that immigrants sort themselves into 
ethnic enclaves as those enclaves enable the consumption of ethnic goods (Chiswick and 
Miller 2005) and reduce the need to assimilate to the host country (Lazear 1999). 
Yet, it is an open question whether or not self-selection is indeed the driving force 
of immigrant residential segregation. A contrasting view is that housing discrimination 
plays an important role  (Galster 1992, Yinger 1998).  This view emphasizes that 
immigrants live in segregated neighborhoods not because they prefer to live there but 
because natives restrict immigrant location choices to specific areas.  This view is 
supported by field studies.
1  However,  while  field studies provide evidence of 
discrimination in the housing market, they usually do not provide evidence  of  a 
relationship between housing discrimination and residential segregation.
2 
Using survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), our study 
examines the association between residential segregation and immigrants’ perceptions of 
discrimination.
3  This  allows investigating whether self-selection or housing 
discrimination plays the crucial role in immigrant residential segregation. If immigrants 
voluntarily sort themselves into ethnic enclaves, there should be no association between 
segregation and perceived discrimination. Yet, if housing discrimination plays the crucial 
role in residential segregation, there should be a significant association.   2 
Moreover,  we can examine the potential channels  of discrimination  in more 
detail. On the one hand, immigrants  may experience  increased discrimination and 
outright hostility from prejudiced native neighbors if they live in residential areas where 
natives are most present. As a consequence, they are more or less forced to settle in areas 
with other immigrants to escape “everyday” discrimination in their neighborhood. Hence, 
immigrants living in segregated areas should be less likely to report discrimination than 
immigrants living in neighborhoods with a high share of natives.
4 
On the other hand, discrimination by landlords rather than outright hostility by 
native neighbors may drive residential segregation. Natives may, to a greater or lesser 
extent, tolerate the immigrants living in their neighborhood. In this case, immigrants may 
prefer to live in native-dominated areas as these areas allow them to participate in the 
social  and cultural  life of the host country. Landlords may  nonetheless  exclude 
immigrants from native-dominated residential areas  if  the introduction of immigrants 
reduces the willingness of native tenants to pay high rents.
5 Moreover, landlords may 
restrict immigration location choices if they are themselves prejudiced or their experience 
indicates that immigrants are on average tenants with unstable rent payments and less 
diligence in maintaining the dwelling in appropriate condition.  In this situation, 
immigrants who are forced to live in segregated areas should be more likely to report 
discrimination than those who are able to avoid such areas. 
Our estimates for West Germany show that living in a highly segregated area is 
positively associated with perceived discrimination.  This suggests that discriminatory 
treatment  by landlords is an important factor driving ethnic residential segregation. 
Importantly, the positive link between segregation and perceived discrimination applies   3 
to both segregated areas where most neighbors are immigrants from the same country of 
origin as the surveyed person and segregated areas where most neighbors are immigrants 
from other countries of origin. Particularly, the positive link between the first type of 
segregated area and perceived discrimination corroborates the interpretation that housing 
discrimination rather than self-selection plays an important role in immigrant residential 
segregation. If self-selection would be the driving force behind immigrant segregation, 
areas with neighbors from the same country of origin should be specifically attractive as 
immigrants can share the same culture and language. Yet, even immigrants living in these 
areas are more likely to report discrimination. Our results hold true even when controlling 
for other influences such as household income, rent payment, and quality of the dwelling. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 
3 discusses the variables. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Data 
Our empirical analysis uses data from the SOEP (Wagner et al. 1993). The SOEP is a 
large representative longitudinal survey of private households in Germany. The survey is 
administered by the German Economic Institute (DIW Berlin). Infratest Sozialforschung, 
a professional survey and opinion institute, conducts the interviews. Based on face-to-
face interviews, a nucleus  of  socio-economic and demographic questions is asked 
annually. Different ‘special’ topics are sampled in specific waves. The first wave of 
interviews started in 1984 with the collection of data in the former West Germany. While 
the survey has been extended to East Germany after German reunification, the number of 
foreigners in the East German subsample is too small to allow a separate analysis. Hence, 
our examination is restricted to West Germany.   4 
Immigrants  are oversampled in the SOEP. The initial cohort of immigrants 
included persons from the former guest worker countries Italy, Greece, Spain, Turkey, 
and Yugoslavia.  During the latter half of the 1950s the German government started 
actively recruiting guest workers in response to a labor shortage prompted by very high 
economic growth rates. In 1973 the government stopped the recruitment of further guest 
workers as Germany entered a period of economic recession. In the subsequent years, the 
inflow of immigrants from the former guest worker countries consisted mainly of family 
members of those guest workers who remained in Germany (family reunification). We 
focus on first generation immigrants from Italy, Greece, Spain and Turkey. Immigrants 
from the former Yugoslavia are excluded from the analysis because of Yugoslavia’s 
diverse ethnic and religious groups. 
The 1996 wave of the SOEP includes information on the immigrants’ perceptions 
of discrimination. Information on the ethnic composition of the neighborhood is available 
in the 1994 wave. Hence, we regress perceived discrimination in 1996 on factors 
observed in 1994. Immigrants who changed their place of residence in the period 1994 to 
1996 are excluded from the analysis. 
 
3. Variables 
Table 1 provides  definitions  of the variables  and  descriptive statistics.  In our basic 
regressions, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the immigrant answers that 
he or she is very often discriminated against because of his or her ethnic background. The 
dummy is equal to 0 if the immigrant answers that he or she is never or only sometimes 
discriminated against. 13 percent of the interviewees answer that they are very often 
discriminated against. As the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable, we use the   5 
probit procedure to estimate the determinants of perceived discrimination. An advantage 
of the probit model is that the results are relatively easy to interpret. However, as a check 
of robustness we also estimate a generalized ordered probit with a categorial variable that 
comprises three outcomes: 0 never discriminated  against, 1  sometimes discriminated 
against, 2 very often discriminated against. 
The key explanatory variables are constructed using two pieces of  ordered 
information. First, interviewees are  asked if foreigners live in their neighborhood. 
Second, those who live in residential areas with foreign neighbors are asked if they share 
the same country of origin with their foreign neighbors. Combining the two pieces of 
information yields a classification of five different types of residential areas. The first 
type is a residential area where most or all of the neighbors are foreigners and most or all 
of them are from the same country of origin as the respondent. 8 percent of respondents 
live in such a neighborhood. The second type is a residential area where most or all of the 
neighbors are foreigners and most or all of them are from other countries of origin as the 
respondent. 40 percent of respondents live in this type of neighborhood. Considering the 
two types of residential areas together, 48 percent of immigrants in our sample live in a 
highly segregated neighborhood. The third and the fourth type are residential areas with 
some foreign neighbors. In the third type of residential area, most or all of the foreign 
neighbors are from the same country of origin as the respondent. In the fourth type of 
residential area, most or all of the foreign neighbors are from other countries of origin as 
the respondent. The fifth type is the reference category. In this type of residential area, all 
of the neighbors are Germans. 
  As emphasized, if self-selection plays the dominant role in immigrant residential   6 
segregation, there should be no significant link between living in a segregated residential 
area and perceived discrimination. It is the immigrant’s choice to live in such area. By 
contrast, if discrimination is the  driving force of segregation, we should observe a 
significant association between living in a segregated area and perceived discrimination. 
The sign of the association depends on the type of discrimination. On the one hand, 
outright hostility by native neighbors in native dominated areas may force immigrants to 
settle in areas with other immigrants to escape “everyday” discrimination. In this case, 
immigrants living in segregated areas should be less likely to report discrimination than 
those living in native dominated areas. On the other hand, discrimination by landlords 
rather than hostility by native neighbors may play an important role in residential 
segregation. If natives to a greater or lesser extent tolerate foreign neighbors, immigrants 
may prefer to live in native-dominated areas as this allows them to integrate into the host 
country. Yet, landlords may restrict immigrant location choices if they are themselves 
prejudiced or suspect that the introduction of immigrants results in lower rental income. 
In that case, immigrants who are forced to live in a segregated residential area should be 
more likely to report discrimination than those who are able to find housing in a native-
dominated area.
6 
  The survey provides a rich set of control variables. In our initial specification, we 
control for federal states and demographic characteristics of the interviewee. The 
immigrant’s education may play a role in perceived discrimination. On the one hand, 
negative attitudes toward foreigners are more prevalent among low-educated Germans 
(Gang and Rivera-Batiz 1994, Cornelissen and Jirjahn 2011). To the extent higher-
educated immigrants are less likely to interact with low-educated Germans, they face a   7 
lower risk of discrimination. On the other hand, higher-educated immigrants are likely to 
have higher expectations and requirements. Hence, they may tend to be more sensitive 
with respect to discrimination. Similarly,  expectations may rise with the years the 
immigrant lives in Germany. The immigrant’s income is also likely to play a role. 
Immigrants with a higher income have more financial opportunities to avoid 
discrimination. Furthermore, we account for gender, presence of children and country of 
origin. 
  We expand the specification by including variables for neighborhood 
characteristics.  The expanded specification accounts for urban areas, contacts to 
neighbors, satisfaction with environmental conditions in the neighborhood, and 
satisfaction with the availability of goods and services in the neighborhood. This allows 
examining whether or not the ethnic composition of the neighborhood is just a proxy for 
other neighborhood characteristics (Swaroop and Krysan 2011). 
  In a final step, we include variables for housing characteristics. Immigrants may 
be concentrated in residential areas with poor quality housing. As housing satisfaction 
can influence perceived discrimination, it is important to control for the characteristics of 
the dwelling in order to check whether or not a possible link between segregation and 
perceived discrimination is driven by the quality of the dwelling. We account for size of 
dwelling, year of construction, and rent paid for the dwelling. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Basic Results 
Table 2 provides the probit estimates of the determinants of high perceived 
discrimination. In regression (1), several of the variables for demographic characteristics   8 
emerge with statistically significant coefficients. Income is a negative covariate of the 
probability that an immigrant reports being highly discriminated against. Education, years 
since immigration and a Turkish origin are positive covariates. 
Most importantly in our context, the regression shows that immigrants living in 
highly segregated areas are more likely to report high discrimination. This conforms to 
the hypothesis that discrimination by landlords plays an important role in immigrant 
residential segregation.  The association between residential segregation and high 
perceived discrimination applies to both highly segregated areas where most of the 
foreign neighbors are from the same country of origin as the immigrant and highly 
segregated areas where most of the foreign neighbors are from other countries of origin. 
Particularly the association between the first type of segregated area  and perceived 
discrimination corroborates the interpretation that housing discrimination rather than self-
selection is the driving force behind immigrant residential segregation. If self-selection 
would be the driving force, areas with neighbors from the same country of origin should 
be most attractive as immigrants can share the same culture and language. Immigrants 
who sort themselves into these areas would not report  discrimination.  Yet, even 
immigrants living  in these areas  have an increased probability of reporting  high 
discrimination. 
In  column  (2), we expand the specification by including variables for other 
neighborhood characteristics. Three of the four neighborhood variables take statistically 
significant coefficients. Satisfaction with environmental conditions, living in an urban 
area, and contacts with neighbors are negative covariates of perceived discrimination. 
Nonetheless, even when including variables for other neighborhood characteristics, we   9 
still find that both types of highly segregated areas are positively associated with 
perceived discrimination. This suggests that the positive link between living in a 
segregated area and perceived discrimination is not simply due to other neighborhood 
characteristics such as environmental conditions. The concentration of foreigners itself 
appears to drive the link. 
In column (3), we additionally include variables for the quality of dwelling. A 
small size of dwelling and living in a recently constructed home are positively associated 
with perceived discrimination. Most importantly, even when accounting for the quality of 
dwelling, living in a segregated area is a positive covariate of perceived discrimination. 
This suggests that the link between segregation and perceived discrimination is not 
simply driven by poor quality of dwellings in segregated areas. The coefficients on the 
segregation variables are not only statistically but also quantitatively significant. The 
probability of high perceived discrimination increases by 10 percentage points if an 
immigrant lives in a segregated area where most neighbors are from the same country of 
origin. Compared to the mean of 13 percent, this implies an increase by 77 percent. The 
probability of high perceived discrimination  increases by 8 percentage points if the 
immigrant lives in a segregated area where most neighbors are from other countries of 
origin. Compared to the mean, this is an increase by 62 percent. 
 
4.2 Robustness Check 
So far we used a dummy dependent variable for high perceived discrimination. The 
reference group comprised both immigrants with no and  immigrants  with moderate 
perceived discrimination. As a check of robustness, we now consider an ordered variable 
which differentiates between three outcomes. Let  i y  denote the extent of immigrant i’s   10 
perceived discrimination (0 = i never feels discriminated against; 1 = i sometimes feels 
discriminated against; 2 = i very often feels discriminated against). An ordered probit 
model would be the standard procedure to estimate the determinants of the extent of 
perceived discrimination. In this model,  i y  depends on a latent variable  * i y : 
      i i i y ε + = x β' * ,                   (1) 
where  i x  is the vector of explanatory variables, and  β  the vector of coefficients. The 
error term  i ε  has a normal distribution with zero mean and a variance equal to one. 
Taking the latent variable into account, the extent of perceived discrimination is 
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The threshold values  1 µ  and  2 µ  are estimated jointly with  β . However, a shortcoming 
of the simple ordered probit approach is that it has constant threshold values and only a 
single coefficient vector for all outcome categories of the dependent variable.  A 
generalized ordered probit model stands as an alternative to the rather restrictive ordered 
probit model (Boes and Winkelmann 2010). It provides more flexibility as it does not 
treat the thresholds as constant but makes them dependent on the explanatory variables. 
As it allows for different coefficient vectors, the generalized model takes into account 
that the effects of the explanatory variables may vary with the categories of the dependent 
variable. The model makes the thresholds linear functions of the explanatory variables: 
      2),   , 1 (    ~ = + = j i j j ij x ' γ µ µ                 (3) 
where  j µ ~  is a constant term,  i x  again the vector of establishment characteristics, and  j γ    11 
a vector of coefficients. Substituting  ij µ  for  j µ  in (2) and taking the standard normal 
distribution  (.) Φ  into account, we obtain the probabilities: 
    ), ~ (   0) ( Pr 1 1 i i y x ' β − Φ = = µ                  (4a) 
    ), ~ ( ) ~ (   1) ( Pr 1 1 2 2 i i i y x ' β x ' β − Φ − − Φ = = µ µ             (4b) 
    ) ~ ( 1   2) ( Pr 2 2 i i y x ' β − Φ − = = µ ,               (4c) 
where  j j γ β β − =  as we cannot identify  β  and  j γ  separately. The coefficient vectors are 
now allowed to vary across outcomes and we have a vector  j β  for each threshold. 
  Table 3 provides the estimation results of the generalized ordered probit model. 
All control variables listed in column (3) of Table 2 are included in the estimation. In 
order to save space, we only report the coefficients on our key explanatory variables. 
Equation (4c) helps interpret the results. It shows that the probability of high perceived 
discrimination is only influenced by vector  2 β . Against this background, it can be seen 
that the generalized ordered probit model confirms our basic finding. Both types of 




In the policy debate, it is often believed that a lack of immigrant assimilation is due to 
self-selection of immigrants into segregated residential areas. The results of this study 
suggest that housing discrimination rather than self-selection plays an important role in 
immigrant residential segregation. Immigrants living in highly segregated areas are much 
more likely to report high discrimination than those living in non-segregated areas. 
The positive link between segregation and perceived discrimination also indicates   12 
a specific mechanism of discrimination. It suggests that discriminatory restrictions of 
immigrant location choices rather than outright hostility of native neighbors are  the 
driving force of  residential  segregation. In the latter case we would have found that 
immigrants living in segregated areas are less likely to report discrimination as those 
areas provide protection against “everyday” discrimination by native neighbors. Yet, our 
estimates suggest the opposite relationship. Of course, our finding does not mean that 
immigrants living in native-dominated areas experience no discrimination at all in their 
neighborhood. It rather means that from the immigrants’ viewpoint the advantages of 
living in a native-dominated neighborhood outweigh the disadvantage of discriminatory 
treatment by prejudiced native neighbors. As a consequence, immigrants perceive the 
restrictions that force them to live in segregated areas as discrimination. 
We note that our analysis applies to West Germany. It would be interesting to 
extend the analysis to East Germany as xenophobic tendencies appear to be particularly 
high in East Germany (Krueger and Pischke 1997).  This  requires  that sufficient 
information will be available in future waves of the SOEP. 
   13 
Table 1: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics (N = 771) 
 
Variable  Description (Mean, Std. dev.) 
High perceived discrimination  Dummy = 1 if the person feels very often discriminated against 
because of his or her ethnic background (.1258, .3319). 
Modest perceived discrimination  Dummy = 1 if the person feels sometimes discriminated against 
because of his or her ethnic background (.4643, .4990). 
High share of foreigners & 
same country of origin 
Dummy = 1 if most or all neighbors are foreigners and most or 
all of them are from the same country of origin as the immigrant 
(.0778, .2681). 
High share of foreigners & 
other countries of origin 
Dummy = 1 if most or all neighbors are foreigners and most or 
all of them are from other countries of origin as the immigrant 
(.4008, .4904). 
Some foreigners & 
same country of origin 
Dummy = 1 if some neighbors are foreigners and most or all of 
them are from the same country of origin as the immigrant 
(.0558, .2300). 
Some foreigners & 
other countries of origin 
Dummy = 1 if some neighbors are foreigners and most or all of 
them are from other countries of origin as the immigrant (.3554, 
.4789). 
Year of construction 1949-1971  Dummy = 1 if the property was constructed between 1949 and 
1971 (.4100, .4921). 
Year of construction 1972-1980  Dummy = 1 if the property was constructed between 1972 and 
1980 (.1076, .3101). 
Year of construction 1981-1990  Dummy = 1 if the property was constructed between 1981 and 
1990 (.0337, .1806). 
Education  Years of schooling ranging from 7 to 18 years (9.074, 1.829). 
Greece  Dummy = 1 if the immigrant is from Greece (.1764, .3814). 
Italy  Dummy = 1 if the immigrant is from Italy (.2180, .4131). 
Turkey  Dummy = 1 if the immigrant is from Turkey (.5253, .5000). 
Female  Dummy = 1 if the immigrant is a woman (.4578, .4985). 
Equivalence income/100  Real equivalence net income of the household in Euro. The 
Household income is divided by the weighted sum of 
individuals living in the household (7.39, 2.77). 
Size of dwelling  Dwelling area in square meter divided by the number of people 
living in household (22.70, 11.67). 
Rent/100  Rent paid for the dwelling in Euro (3.24, 1.56). 
Urban area  Dummy = 1 if the immigrant lives in an urban area (.1414, 
.3486). 
Availability of goods and 
services in neighborhood 
Satisfaction with the availability of goods and services in the 
neighborhood coded from 0 lowest to 10 highest (7.224, 2.057). 
Environmental conditions  Satisfaction with the environmental conditions in the 
neighborhood coded from 0 lowest to 10 highest (6.545, 1.967).   14 
Contacts with neighbors  Ordered variable for the immigrant’s contacts with neighbors 
coded from 1 “almost no contact” to 5 “very close” (2.966, 
.8506). 
Children  Dummy = 1 if children live in the household (.5460, .4982). 
Years since immigration  Years since the person immigrated to Germany (20.92, 7.384). 
Federal state dummies  Dummy variables to account for the eleven federal states in 
West Germany.   15 
 
Table 2: Determinants of High Perceived Discrimination; Probit Estimates 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
High share of foreigners &  
same country of origin 
.5985    [.0891] 
(1.99)** 
.6543    [.0952] 
(2.09)** 
.8035    [.1009] 
(2.56)** 
High share of foreigners &  
other countries of origin 
.5199    [.0730] 
(2.06)** 
.5304    [.0702] 
(2.05)** 
.6759    [.0763] 
(2.57)** 
Some foreigners &  
same country of origin 
.4007    [.0513] 
(1.14) 
.3965    [.0471] 
(1.07) 
.5128    [.0501] 
(1.39) 
Some foreigners &  
other countries of origin 
.2740    [.0316] 
(1.04) 
.2718    [.0291] 
(0.99) 
.4243    [.0383] 
(1.56) 
Female  -.1494    [-.0243] 
(1.09) 
-.1360    [-.0210] 
(0.99) 
-.1450    [-.0206] 
(1.04) 
Education  .0577    [.0094] 
(1.70)* 
.0531    [.0082] 
(1.54) 
.0583    [.0083] 
(1.65)* 
Years since immigration  .0180    [.0029] 
(1.71)* 
.0170    [.0026] 
(1.61) 
.0194    [.0028] 
(1.84)* 
Equivalence income/100  -.0914    [-.0149] 
(3.22)*** 
-.0954    [-.0147] 
(3.26)*** 
-.1000    [-.0143] 
(3.28)*** 
Turkey  .6581    [.0765] 
(1.90)* 
.6526    [.0717] 
(1.89)* 
.6610    [.0574] 
(1.78)* 
Italy  .2672    [.0218] 
(0.74) 
.2377    [.0179] 
(0.65) 
.3361    [.0211] 
(0.86) 
Greece  .4341    [.0415] 
(1.21) 
.4534    [.0417] 
(1.27) 
.5349    [.0411] 
(1.39) 
Children  .0796    [.0130] 
(0.59) 
.0705    [.0109] 
(0.52) 
-.0678    [-.0097] 
(0.41) 
Urban area  ---  -.3220    [-.0497] 
(1.72)* 
-.2500    [-.0357] 
(1.35) 
Availability of goods and services  ---  -.0156    [-.0024] 
(0.50) 
-.0262    [-.0037] 
(0.84) 
Environmental conditions  ---  -.0843    [-.0130] 
(2.31)** 
-.0844    [-.0121] 
(2.25)** 
Contacts with neighbors  ---  -.1448    [-.0223] 
(2.02)** 
-.1507    [-.0216] 
(1.97)** 
Size of dwelling  ---  ---  -.0143    [-.0020] 
(1.83)* 
Rent/100  ---  ---  -.0178    [-.0025] 
(0.32) 
Year of construction 1949-1971  ---  ---  -.1611    [-.0215] 
(1.07) 
Year of construction 1972-1980  ---  ---  -.0323    [-.0047] 
(0.13) 
Year of construction 1981-1990  ---  ---  1.091    [.2981] 
(3.33)***   16 






Federal state dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  771  771  771 
Pseudo R
2  0.1295  0.1503  0.1783 
The table shows the estimated coefficients. Robust z-statistics are in parentheses and marginal 
effects are in square brackets. Marginal effects of dummy variables are evaluated for a discrete 
change from 0 to 1. Marginal effects of the dummies for neighborhood segregation (dummies for 
country of origin) are changes in probability compared to the reference group of persons living in 
a neighborhood without foreigners (reference group of people from Spain). Marginal effects of 
variables other than the dummy variables are evaluated at the mean values. *** Statistically 






Table 3: Determinants of the Extent of Perceived Discrimination; Generalized Ordered  
               Probit Estimation 
 
  β1  β2 
High share of foreigners &  
same country of origin  -.4285 (1.86)*  .7970 (2.59)*** 
High share of foreigners &  
other countries of origin  .1958 (1.15)  .6166 (2.29)** 
Some foreigners &  
same country of origin  -.0934 (0.36)  .5257 (1.41) 
Some foreigners &  
other countries of origin  .2313 (1.37)  .2597 (0.93) 
Log Likelihood  -648.57 
Observations  771 
The table shows the estimated coefficients. Robust z-statistics are in parentheses. *** Statistically 
significant at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; * at the 10% level. The regression includes all 
control variables listed in column (3) of Table 2.    18 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Specifically in the US, a series of audit studies has been conducted (Ondrich et al. 1999, 
Page 1995, Yinger 1999). Testers from two different ethnic groups are matched and 
trained so that they make equivalent enquiries when speaking to prospective landlords. 
Moreover, there are recent field studies from several countries which use written 
applications (Ahmed and Hammarstedt 2008 and Ahmed et al. 2010 for Sweden, Bosch 
et al. 2010, 2011 for Spain, Carpusor and Loges for the U.S.). Fictitious persons with 
distinctive sounding ethnic names apply for vacant rental apartments via the Internet. The 
results of the  various field  studies point in the same direction: Members of ethnic 
minority groups are shown and offered fewer housing units. 
2 An exception is the field study by Bosch et al. (2011). They find that the discrimination 
of applicants with foreign sounding names is more severe in areas with a low presence of 
immigrants. 
3  Dill et al. (2011) examine the relationship between residential segregation and 
immigrants’ neighborhood satisfaction in Germany. This study complements their 
examination by using a more direct measure of discrimination. 
4 Studies by Hunt et al. (2007) and Dailey et al. (2010) suggest that this holds true for 
African Americans in the US. 
5 Prejudiced natives may try avoiding areas with a high share of immigrant neighbors 
instead of showing outright hostility. Saiz and Wachter (2011) show that the growth of a 
neighborhood’s immigrant share is associated with slower housing value appreciation. 
Card et al. (2008) provide evidence of a flight of whites once the minority share exceeds 
a critical level.   21 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 Note that finding housing is usually also a stochastic process. This holds true for both 
housing discrimination and self-segregation.  In case of  housing  discrimination, an 
immigrant is subject to discrimination with some exogenous probability (less than 1). The 
immigrant can avoid housing discrimination with the complementary probability. In case 
of self-segregation, an immigrant has an exogenous probability (less than 1) of finding 
vacant housing in a preferred segregated neighborhood. He or she fails to find vacant 
housing in such a neighborhood with the complementary probability.  